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Abstract 
New Zealand, like many other nations has seen a dramatic fall in both the frequency and length of industrial disputes 
since the highs of the 1970s and early 1980s. This paper investigates and assesses the influence of aggregate economic 
and labour market conditions, and the resultant effects of those conditions, on the scale and scope of industrial disputes 
in New Zealand between 1988 and 2001. To this end, the purpose of this paper is to determine the influence of the 
prevailing legislation; the decline in union density and the relative strength of unions in each industry; and the 
importance of economic growth, wages and inflation on the length and frequency of industrial ~s. 
Introduction 
Industrial disputes are costly. In a protracted dispute the 
cost of a strike or lockout is often greater to both parties 
than benefits gained once the dispute is resolved. This 
paper investigates the literature on the influences and 
causes of industrial disputes and applies this information 
to ascertain the influence of macro-variables on industrial 
stoppages in New Zealand. The period of this analysis 
begins in the years prior to the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Act and concludes with the first 
fifteen months of the Employment Relations Act. 
This period saw great change in the number of industrial 
stoppages. There were 172 stoppages in 1988, resulting in 
381,710 person days of work lost. In the year to 2001, the 
number of disputes had fallen to 42, just a quarter of the 
1988 figure. Likewise in 2001 there were 54,440 person 
days of work lost from stoppages - 86 percent fewer than 
the comparable 1988 figure. The purpose of this paper is 
to investigate reasons for this fall. To this end, this paper 
examines union membership and density, change in 
wages and inflation, Gross Domestic Product and the 
influence of the Employment Contracts Act to determine 
whether they have had an influence on the decline in the 
number of disputes over the past fourteen years. 
Table 1: Industrial Disputes in New Zealand 1988-2001 
Year Total Disputes Number of Number of Person Days of Average Days Approx Loss in Lockouts Em lo ees Involved Work Lost Lost Per Worker Wa es $ 000 
1988 172 0 103,981 381,710 3.7 32,632 
1989 171 0 78,921 193,308 2.4 18,763 
1990 137 1 50,007 330,923 6.6 48,433 
1991 71 3 51,962 99,032 1.9 11,577 
1992 54 7 26,803 113,742 4.2 19,372 
1993 58 5 21,303 23,770 1.1 2,863 
1994 69 6 16,042 38,262 2.4 4,580 
1995 69 2 32,048 53,352 ( 1.7 6,813 
1996 72 3 42,307 69,514 1.6 9,768 
1997 42 2 7,646 24,616 3.2 3,126 
1998 35 15,205 11,778 0.8 1,887 
1999 32 1 10,747 16,674 1.6 3,343 
2000 21 0 2,632 11,495 4.4 2,272 
2001 42 2 22,022 54,440 2.5 7,682 
Source: Statistics New Zealand Labour Market Statistics (various years) 
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As illustrated by Table 1, there are a number of possible 
ways to measure the number of industrial disputes. Total 
disputes, for example, records the total number of 
stoppages in a year. This includes both full and partial 
strikes (such as a 'go-slow', 'work to rule' or 'overtime 
ban') and lockouts. Between 1988 and 2001, the number 
of number of total stoppages fell from 172 in 1988 to a 
mere 21 in 2000 and 42 in 2001. This is extremely low in 
comparison to the late 1970s, when the highest number of 
stoppages was recorded - 562 in 1977. Also of note, 
lockouts have been a comparative rarity in New Zealand, 
with the figure never reaching double figures during this 
period of analysis. 
Alternatively, stoppages can be measured by the number 
of employees involved in industrial disputes. Table 1 
shows that this peaked in 1988 at 103,981 employees and 
has since fallen to less than a quarter of that level in 200 I. 
This figure however, includes employees who are not 
directly involved in the industrial dispute; for example, it 
includes non-striking employees who are unable to carry 
out their normal duties because of a stoppage. 
The number of person days of work lost from industrial 
disputes is calculated from the number hours not worked 
by striking or locked out employees and then converted 
into a standard eight hour day. This indicator of industrial 
disputes has fallen considerably over the period of this 
analysis from a high of 381,710 in 1988 to a low of 
11,495 in 2000. Interestingly, however, the number of 
person days lost per worker involved in an industrial 
dispute has remained relatively stable over the period 
examined, with usually between one-and-a-half and four-
and-a-half days of work lost per employee. 
Corresponding with the fall in the number of disputes in 
New Zealand is a large re~ in the value of lost 
wages and salaries from a high of $48.4 million in 1990 
to $2.3 million in 2000. This however, does not take into 
Figure I: Disputes and Union Density 1988-2001 
account the fact that employees may 'catch-up' on work 
not carried out once the dispute is resolved. 
Accordingly, there are several different indicators of 
industrial disputes available to be analysed. The 
regressions in this paper employ two indicators of 
industrial disputes. First, the total number of disputes -
but given that we cannot determine the length of these 
stoppages, later regressions use person days of work lost 
from industrial disputes as the dependent variable. 
So what has happened in the last decade and a half that 
could have caused the number of disputes to fall at such a 
rapid rate? The fall may . in part be attributable to the 
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991. 
The Employment Contracts Act ended union monopoly 
rights over industrial relations matters; promoted 
individual employment contracts over collective 
arrangements; contributed to a collapse of multi-employer 
bargaining and a reduction of collective bargaining 
coverage; and saw a 50 percent reduction in union 
membership. The Employment Contracts Act also greatly 
diminished the power of unions to operate. This is not 
surprising given that the Act did not use the word 'union' 
at any point. Essentially, the Employment Contracts Act 
irrevocably changed the nature of the industrial relations 
system in New Zealand. This change is observable in 
Figure I, which shows the fall in union density 
throughout the 1990s and that this fall is matched by a fall 
in the number of industrial disputes. 
The Employment Relations Act has since replaced the 
Employment Contracts Act. The new Act promotes 
collective bargaining and 'good faith' employment 
relations. Essentially, it represents a notable shift away 
from the approach taken by the Employment Contracts 
Act. 
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Table 2 below shows recent trends on causes of stoppages 
in New Zealand workplaces. The data, which allows for 
multiple responses, is only available for the last three 
years. However, is shows that between 53 and 71 percent 
of stoppages have been disputes over wages provisions in 





Dispute arising D. t 
from negotiation Ispu e ~~er 
of covera e of wage provisions 

















employment agreements - which essentially means that 
quarter to a half of disputes have not been about wages~ 
These disputes are less likely to be influenced by many of 
the variables analysed in this paper as disputes pertaining 
























Source: Statistics New Zealand (2002) Labour Market Statistics 
Existing research on the causes and influences of 
industrial disputes can be broadly placed into one (or 
more) of three categories; those that focus on economic, 
institutional or sociological factors. In recent years, there 
have been a large number of papers examining the 
economic causes of industrial disputes. These either take 
a broad overview approach (as this paper does) or they 
use contract data to develop a theory on the causes of 
strike activity. 
In 1969, Ashenfelter and Johnson wrote what has come to 
be considered one of the seminal works on the causes of 
strike activity. They write that there are three parties 
involved in labour-management negotiations 
employers, employees and union leaders. Moreover, that 
the motivations of the union leadership differ from the 
regular members (including for example, their own 
survival as leaders of the union). If the union leadership 
accept a wage offer from the employer which the 
employees deem insufficient, they face "the possibility 
that the contract will not be ratified by the membership 
and /or charges that they have 'sold out' to management" 
(1969: 3 7). Alternatively, Ashenfelter and Johnson 
propose that a strike "has the effect of lowering the rank 
and file's expectations due to the shock effect of the 
firm's resistance and the loss of normal income" (ibid). 
Hence, an industrial dispute could be considered an 
instrument to reduce the expectations cif union members. 
Hicks (1963) on the other hand, suggests that strikes 
occur because of imperfect information in process of 
collective bargaining, or 'mistakes' due to faults in the 
bargaining process. He writes "the majority of actual 
strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation" 
(1963: 146). He holds that when there is a large 
difference of opinion between the employer and the union 
on the length of time that the employees would be 
prepared to strike rather than accept a given set of terms, 
a deadlock is virtually inevitable. 
McConnell (1990) examines the role of aggregate 
business, labour and product market conditions on strike 
incidence and duration in the United States. Findings 
include that strike incidence is highest in industries that 
are depressed relative to the rest of the economy, also that 
strikes are longest in industries that are booming relative 
to the rest of the economy. Rees (1952) suggests that 
strike activity may in fact be greater at times of high 
unemployment than at other times, because when the 
labour market tslack the. organisation is likely to find it 
easier to replac striking workers and avoid interruptions 
to production. owever, it must be emphasised that the 
influence of unemployment on industrial stoppages in 
New Zealand is likely to be much lower than in other 
jurisdictions. Research on the level of strike activity in 
the United States for example, often examines stoppages 
that continue for weeks - sometimes months. Where 
disputes continue for this length of time, employees need 
to find alternative sources of income. In New Zealand, the 
average number of days of work lost per employee is 
between 0.8 and 6.6 days (as shown in Table 1). It is 
unlikely that either striking employees will have time to 
find work elsewhere or employers would have time to 
hire and train replacement workers (which is prohibited 
by the Employment Relations Act). 
Much of the international literature has found that work 
stoppages are pro-cyclical. That is, when the economy is 
strong, the number of work stoppages increases, and 
when the economy is faltering, the number of stoppages 
decreases. This trend is particularly evident in the United 
States where Rees (1952), Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969), Gunderson, Kervin and Reid (1986) and Vroman 
(1989) all find that strike incidence varies pro-cyclically. 
lngram et al (1993) however, study strikes in British 
manufacturing in the 1980s and contrary to U.S. 
experience, strikes appear to be counter cyclical - i.e. 
strikes increased as unemployment increased. 
Gramm (1986) undertakes a ·micro-level study of U.S. 
manufacturing data and finds that a number of factors 
influence strike incidence. These include the gender 
composition of the labour force, demand fluctuations in 
the product market, union density in the industry, and the 
extent to which wages have kept pace with inflation over 
the preceding contract period. On the other hand, Gramm 
also finds that neither the local unemployment rate when 
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contract negotiations began nor the inflation rate over the 
term of the expiring contract influenced strike frequency 
or length. 
Institutional and political factors, most notably the 
structure of the institutional relations system and the laws 
pertaining to when it is and is not legal to strike also play 
a central role in determining the frequency and length of 
industrial disputes. For example, Gunderson and Melino 
( 1990) find that policy variables (such as legislation 
prohibiting the use or replacement workers and 
compulsory mediation) reduce incidence of strikes but do 
not, with the exception of a mandatory strike vote, reduce 
the length of strikes. 
Sociological factors that determine whether a group of 
employees choose to strike are by their very nature the 
most difficult to measure. Furthermore, the reasons why 
an individual worker chooses to strike are likely to be 
very different in each case. For example, the labour 
process model of industrial disputes holds that inherent 
ideological conflicts between management and labour 
make the workplace a demanding environment. 
Accordingly, the best mechanism to investigate 
sociological explanations of industrial disputes is the case 
study - rather than a statistical paper. Following this line 
of thought Blyton and Tumbull write: 
"To seek an understanding of the nature of conflict 
within work organisations is to grapple with a complex 
phenomenon. While much analysis focuses on strike 
statistics which provide a ready 'index' of conflict, these 
data can offer a misleading picture. In recent years, for 
example, there has been a tendency to equate the decline 
in officially recorded strikes with a decline (or even 
demise) of industrial conflict. Not only does this ignore 
the intensity of the conflict and bitterness of feelings 
involved in many strike situations, it ignores the diverse 
nature of both strikes and other forms of industrial 
conflict. . . . we have trrefore cautioned against any 
suggestion that industria conflict has 'withered away', 
emphasising instead th many and varied forms of 
industrial conflict, the importance of both attitudes and 
behaviour, and the influence of a diverse range of 
structural, contextual and individual factors, both within 
the workplace and beyond. In particular, we have argued 
for a greater appreciation of the underlying (and 
continuing) sources of tension and conflict within 
contemporary work organisations" (1994: 294). 
The Model 
The statistical model employed in this paper is designed 
to determine the extent to which union membership and 
density, inflation, wages, Gross Domestic Product and the 
Employment Contracts Act influence the number of 
industrial disputes in a given industry for a given year and 
the total number of working days lost in each industry for 
each year. The following equation is illustrative of . the 
those employed in subsequent regressions: 
DISPUTES;, = a + pUNION;, + q>ECA;, + yiNFLA TION;1 
+ 8WAGES;1 + <j>LOGGDP;1 + 1:/.INDUSTRY;, + 
L\j/YEAR;, + Ert (1) 
Where DISPUTES;, is measured as the total number of 
industrial disputes in a given industry i at year t. UNION 
is the total number of union members in industry i at time 
t. ECA is a dummy variable recording whether the 
Employment Contracts Act was in effect at the time. The 
other explanatory variables in equation (1) are 
INFLATION, as measured by change in the Consumers 
Price Index (base= 1 000), WAGES, measured by the 
change in the Labour Cost Index all salary and wage rates 
series (and the Prevailing Weekly Wage Rate Index for 
the years up to 1992; base=lOOO), LOGGDP measures the 
natural log of Gross Domestic Product and INUSTRY 
and YEAR are dummy variables accounting for the 
relevant industry (manufacturing, transport, storage and 
communication, and community, social and personal 
services) and year specific effects (1988 - 2000) 
respectively. 
Equation (1) obviously contains the predicament of a 
relationship between two independent variables - namely 
union membership and the Employment Contracts Act. 
To overcome this problem a two-stage-least-squares 
model is applied for regressions 2 to 6. The equations 
applied are illustrated as follows: 
DISPUTES;, = a + PUNION;1 + q>ECA;1 + yiNFLA TION, 
+ 8WAGES;1 + <j>GDP;1 + 1:A.INDUSTRY;1 + 1:\j/YEAR;, + 
Ert (2) 
UNION;1 =a+ q>ECA;1 + yiNFLATION, + 8WAGES;1 + 
<j>GDP;, + 1:A.INDUSTRY;, + L\j/YEAR;, + Crt (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) show the two-stage-least-squares 
equation applied for regressions 2 to 6. It also includes 
the exogenous variables pertaining to the Employment 
Contracts Act, change in inflation, change in wages, the 
natural log of GDP and the time and industry dummy 
variables. 
In addition to the models specified in equations (1) to (3), 
there are two significant changes that are carried out in 
subsequent regressions. First, the total number of disputes 
is one of a number of possible dependent variables .that 
can be used to determine the influence of macro-variables 
on industrial disputes. Hence, to gain a better 
understanding of the length of industrial stoppages, in 
regressions 5 and 6 we replace the number of disputes 
with the number of person days of work lost from 
industrial disputes (PERS _DAYS) as the dependent 
variable. Second, regressions 3 to 6 replace the 
independent variable union membership with union 
density (measured as union membership as a percentage 
of people employed from the Household Labour Force 
Survey). 
In carrying out the above regression model, it would be 
expected that union membership and union density be 
positively related to both the number of disputes and the 
number of person days lost from industrial disputes. This 
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is because as the union's influence in the workplace 
increases their ability to barging for further benefits also 
increases - hence, the possibility of an industrial dispute 
increases. Given that the Employment Contracts Act 
effectively removed many of the existing benefits for 
employees, it would be expected that the years associated 
with the Employment Contracts Act would be years 
where industrial disputes are lower - all else being equal. 
Inflation essentially reduces the purchasing power of a 
given wage. Hence, as inflation increases, it is expected 
that the number of disputes will increase as employees 
need to make higher wage demands to maintain their 
current real wage. For basically the same reasons, 
positive changes in wages are expected to be associated 
with fewer work stoppages, as higher wage changes are 
expected to reduce the likelihood of employees being 
involved in an industrial stoppage. In later regressions, 
the difference between wage change and inflation is 
investigated as a potential explanatory variable. One 
would expect that high levels of inflation are less likely to 
be associated with increased disputes, if there is a 
corresponding high wage change. Therefore, by including 
the difference between wages and inflation we can 
ascertain whether the level of wage change is above or 
below the level of inflation, and specifically what the 
difference between the two is. We would expect that 
when the difference between wages change and inflation 
is positive the number of stoppages would be lower than 
when inflation is above the level of wage change - as 
when wage increases in above inflation the employees 
have effectively received a real wage increase - reducing 
the likelihood of going on strike. We would also expect 
the reverse to be the case. That is, when inflation is above 
the level of wage change, the employees are more likely 
to strike as they do not want to settle for what amounts to 
a real wage decrease. To test whether industrial disputes 
are pro-cyclical in New Zealand, the natural log of Gross 
Domestic Product is included as an independent variable. 
If industrial stoppages are indeed pro-cyclical, we would 
expect a positive coefficient on this variable, and of 
course a negative coefficient if stoppages are anti-
cyclical. 
Regression 1 uses weighted least squares to control for 
hetroscedasticity. As the industries are of different sizes, 
and have a large variation in the number of people 
employed one can expect non-constant variance between 
observations, or hetroscedasticity. To control for this, the 
total number of people employed (from the Household 
Labour Force Survey) is applied as the weight. To put it 
simply, this is because industries that have relatively less 
people employed will have a different variance of 
industrial stoppages than industries with relatively more 
employment. 
The results of the first regression show the relationship 
between the number of disputes as the dependent variable 
and union membership and the Employment Contracts 
Act as the independent variables. Both independent 
variables are of the expected sign, union membership 
being positively related to the number of disputes and the 
Employment Contracts Act having a negative relationship 
with disputes - what's more, both are statistically 
significant at the one percent level of significance. 
However, the obvious relationship between union 
membership and the introduction of the Employment 
Contracts Act is not controlled for in this regression. To 
overcome this problem subsequent regressions apply the 
two-stage-least-squares method to control for the 
relationship between these two variables. 
Regression 2, as referred to above, introduces the two-
stage-least-squares model and also uses the total number 
of people employed as a weight (as do all subsequent 
regressions). Moreover, it also includes dummy variables 
to account for industry specific effects. The results in 
model two remain strong. Both union membership and 
the Employment Contracts Act have a statistically 
significant influence on the total number of disputes, 
albeit not so large as in the previous regression. Union 
membership has a slightly larger coefficient than in the 
previous regression, however, it is statistically significant 
at the ten percent level - rather than o?apercent in the 
first regression. The Employment Contr cts Act has a 
slightly smaller coefficient and it too ha a reduced level 
of significance from the one percent level to the five 
percent level of significance. 
Regression 3 introduces other independent variables into 
the equation. Namely, union density is used as an 
instrumental variable instead of union membership. Also 
change in inflation, change in wages and the natural log 
of GDP are included as explanatory variables - in 
addition to year specific dummy variables. Both change 
in inflation and change in wages record negative 
coefficients, although neither are statistically significant. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the natural log of 
GDP has a negative coefficient - and what's more is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Why this 
is the case is somewhat problematic. It is most likely 
attributable to the somewhat poor economic performance 
of the New Zealand economy in the late 1980s and early 
1990s rather than a factor causing the number of 
stoppages to increase. Hence, positing that industrial 
disputes in New Zealand are anti-cyclical may be 
erroneous. We will investigate this issue more closely in 
regression 6. 
Regression 4 replaces wages and inflation with the 
difference between the two. The theory being that 
disputes will be higher when inflation is above the level 
of wage change, and the number of disputes will fall 
when wage change is higher than inflation. This is borne 
out by the sign and magnitude of the variable in 
regression 4. Wage change less inflation is of the correct 
sign (negative) and is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This regression is also notable because all 
of the other independent variables are also statistically 
significant. Union density is positive and statistically 
significant at the five percent level of significance and the 
period of the Employment Contracts Act remains 
negative and is statistically significant at the ten percent 
level. Note however, that the natural log of GDP remains 
negative and records a one percent level of significance. 
One could argue that the total number of disputes is not 
the best dependent variable to be used in the regression. 
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As discussed above it treats all stoppages equally -
whatever their length. For this reason, disputes has been 
replaced in regressions 5 and 6 with the number of person 
days lost from industrial disputes as the dependent 
variable. As with the other regressions, two-stage-least-
squares is applied to control for the relationship between 
union density and other independent variables, also the 
number of people employed is used as a weight. 
Regression 5 in this paper is probably the most accurate 
determinant of industrial disputes, as discussed above it 
uses the number of person days lost from industrial 
disputes as the dependent variable. It includes all the 
independent variables applied in regression 4 and 
includes the difference between wages and inflation and 
the natural log of Gross Domestic Product. This 
regression suggests that union density is an influence on 
the number of person days lost from strikes and lockouts. 
It shows that for a one percentage point increase in union 
density, the number of industrial stoppages is likely to 
increase by around 7,000. This result is statistically 
significant at the ten percent level of significance. 
Furthermore, it shows that the period of the Employment 
Contracts Act was related to 66,000 fewer person days 
lost by industrial disputes. This result is statistically 
Table Three: Regression Results 
Regression 1 2 3 
significant at the five percent level of significance. When 
the level of wage change is above the level of inflation 
then the number of person days lost from industrial 
disputes falls. This result too is statistically significant. 
The natural log of GDP PI"Oduces a strong result, though 
not statistically significant. 
As discussed above, the negative coefficient on the 
natural log of GDP is likely to be attributable to the 
structural and institutional difficulties of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, rather than an actual anti-cyclical 
relationship. To test this theory a regression similar to 
regression 5 has been undertaken. In this regression (6) 
data for the years prior to 1991 are omitted. The resulting 
effect is that the natural log of GDP becomes positive and 
is statistically significant at the ten percent level. This 
result adds weight to the likelihood that the negative 
results in earlier regressions are erroneous. Moreover, to 
be sure of such a relationship, one would ideally use a 
longer period of analysis than either 10 or 14 years. 
Fourteen years may be to short of a period to be sure of 
any cyclical pattern. Many of the U.S. studies referred to 
above were of a time period of twenty years or more to 
ensure that they included more than one cycle of 
economic growth. 
4 5 6 
WLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dep Var: DISPUTES DISPUTES DISPUTES DISPUTES PERS DAYS PERS DAYS 
Inde . Var: 
UNION 0.080" 0.111 c 
(0.029) (0.062) 
DENSITY 2.586c 1.805b 7.030c 2.735 
(1.418) (0.868) (3.839) (1.914) 
ECA -13.814" -11.888b -39.229 -13.037c -66.491 b 
(3.899) (4.981) (25.17) (6.742) (29.803) 
LOG GDP -31.357 -32.566" -74.382 55.094c 






WGE-INFL -1.262" -5.259" -0.593 
(0.286) (1.264) (0.646) 
INDDUM None 3 3 3 3 3. 
TIME DUM None None 13 13 13 10 
WEIGHT Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed 
CONSTANT 18.968 13.060 355.894 1580.623 5889.738 -32.223 
ADJR2 0.3964 0.5543 0.4674 0.7480 0.5024 0.3963 
N 56 56 56 56 56 43 
Standard error in parentheses 
Levelofsignificance: "1%, b5%, c10% 
254 Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2002 
Discussion 
The decline in industrial disputes in recent years very 
much matches the decline in union membership and 
union density. This result continues even after controlling 
for any influence the Employment Contracts Act has had 
on union membership and density. 
The Employment Contracts Act was, not surprisingly, a 
negative influence in the level of stoppage actively. This 
result was statistically significant in all regressions apart 
from number 4. 
Economic growth, as measured by the natural log of 
Gross Domestic Product, has not turned out to be a 
particularly useful variable in explaining the decline in 
industrial stoppages. This could be because either Gross 
Domestic Product has had no effect on disputes (which 
would go against international evidence) or most likely 
because the period of this analysis is too short to make 
any substantive conclusion as to its applicability. 
This paper has shown that the difference between the 
change in wage levels and inflation is also a statistically 
significant influence in both the number of disputes and 
the number of person days lost from industrial disputes. 
This result is consistent with Gramm's 1986 paper 
refereed to earlier. Inflation on its own is not a 
statistically significant determinant on the level of 
industrial stoppage activity. It is whether wages have kept 
pace with inflation that influences the level of industrial 
disputes. 
Other factors are also likely to have influenced the level 
of industrial stoppages over the past fourteen years that 
are not referred to in the above analysis. For example, the 
industries that have shown the greatest relative decline in 
employment in recent years, such as the manufacturing 
industry, have been the industries which traditionally 
have had a high level of industrial disputes. Richard 
Hyman, writing about the decline of strikes in the U.K. 
has suggested that "these are the areas of employment 
which have declined most sharply in recent decades; 
whereas employment has grown in sectors without a 
tradition of collective militancy" (1999). Similarly, these 
same industries are now much more open to international 
competition than they have been in the past. Again, 
Hyman writes "[the] priority of survival in an ever more 
competitive world reinforces the pursuit of peaceful 
solutions"(ibid). 
Further Research 
This paper merely begins to tell the story on the 
influences on industrial disputes. The reasons why 
employees choose to strike are many and varied. 
Accordingly, there is a great deal of opportunity for 
further research on this topic in the New Zealand 
environment. Such opportunities include the use of 
collective bargaining records to ascertain the reasons for 
disputes in individual workplaces. Similarly, case studies 
and interviews of key stakeholders provide the 
opportunity to investigate the root causes of industrial 
disputes in the workplace. Such industry and case study 
analysis will aid the development of a comprehensive 
picture of the causes and reasons for industrial disputes in 
New Zealand. 
Notes 
I. This study is part of a larger project which receives 
funding from the Public Good Science Fund 
administered by the Foundation for Research, 
Science and Technology (Contract no. VIC903). 
2. The industrial dispute statistics in this paper exclude 
work stoppages in which less than five person days of 
work were lost (prior to 2000 stoppages of less than 
ten person days of work were excluded from official 
statistics). J 
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